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THE CURRENT STATE OF EQUITY INVESTMENTS BY
FOREIGN FUNDS [IN SOUTH KOREA] AND RELATED
LEGAL ISSUES
Written by Hee Chul Kang†
Translated by Eugene Kim‡
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2004, the South Korean press gave extensive news
coverage to a series of private individual “Question & Answer” session
meetings which the Capital Group Companies Fund (“Capital Group”) held
with many of the top chief executive officers (“CEOs”) of major Korean
corporations.1 Known worldwide as a top U.S. private equity management
company, the Capital Group is currently the largest institutional investor in
South Korea. As a major shareholder of large corporations such as Samsung
Electronics, the Shin Han Financial Group, SK Group, and Hyundai Motors,
the U.S. investment firm invited their CEOs to address questions and seek
answers concerning the corporations’ overall performance and business
trends. The fact that the CEOs readily accepted the Capital Group’s
invitation reveals just how great of an influence foreign investment funds
exert on corporate management and governance of major corporations in
South Korea.
News of Sovereign Asset Management (“Sovereign”)’s clash with SK
Corporation (“SK”) in early 2004 has also been well publicized, highlighting
foreign funds’ willingness to participate in company management in South
Korea. After having acquired 14.99% of SK Corp. shares, the European
private equity fund took a hostile turn against SK Corp.’s management and
controlling shareholders. At SK Corp.’s annual shareholders meeting held in
March 2004, Sovereign submitted a shareholder proposal seeking to elect
†
The author is a senior partner at Woo Yun Kang Jeong & Han. Mr. Kang practices primarily in
the areas of corporate securities, M&A, banking, and finance, and is admitted to practice in South Korea
and New York. Mr. Kang’s article was originally published in Korean in KOREAN JOURNAL OF SECURITIES
LAW, Dec. 2004.
‡
J.D. and LL.M. in Asian & Comparative Law, University of Washington School of Law (2005);
M.P.A., Columbia University (1998). Mr. Kim is an associate in the Seattle office of Preston Gates &
Ellis. The translation was made possible in part by the Foreign Language Area Studies Fellowship from
the U.S. Department of Education.
1
See, e.g., The U.S.’s Mighty Capital Group Visits . . . Initial Interviews with Korean CEOs, MAEIL
ECONOMY NEWS, Sep. 15, 2004, at A24.
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new candidates for the board of directors and to amend the company’s
articles of incorporation, culminating in a bitter proxy contest between
Sovereign and SK Corp.2
Moreover, in recent years, large foreign funds investing in South
Korea have either acquired or attempted to acquire management control
rights of some of the country’s largest companies and financial institutions.
Notable examples include Newbridge Capital, the Carlyle Group, and Lone
Star, which purchased controlling stakes in Korea First Bank, KorAm Bank,3
and Korea Exchange Bank, respectively.
As a result of this wave of foreign acquisitions, there has been much
public discussion about whether domestic private equity funds should be
encouraged to compete more effectively with foreign funds operating on
Korean soil. In response, the South Korean government recently amended
the Act on Business of Operating Indirect Investment and Assets (“Indirect
Asset Management Act” or “IAMA”).4 The amended IAMA went into effect
on December 6, 2004, and is poised to establish a new framework for the
establishment and promotion of domestic private equity funds 5 in South
Korea.6
It should come as no surprise that foreign funds have been able to
establish a successful presence in the Korean market, wielding considerable
influence over South Korea’s domestic industries and securities market. The
very existence of foreign funds and their overall activities in South Korea
has become a major social and economic concern. In particular, public
attention has been increasingly focused on so-called foreign private equity
funds and hedge funds.
This Article explores the current state of investments by foreign funds
in South Korea and examines related legal issues. Part I briefly summarizes
2

Translator’s Note: In July 2005, Sovereign Asset Management (“Sovereign”) sold its remaining
shares in SK Corp., reaping a staggering profit of U.S. $900 million.
3
KorAm [Hanmi] Bank was later sold by the Carlyle Group to Citigroup Inc. in February 2004.
4
Translator’s Note: The Act on Business of Operating Indirect Investment and Assets (“Indirect
Asset Management Act” or “IAMA”), formerly referred to as the Indirect Investment Asset Management
Business Act, was originally enacted on January 4, 2004. The IAMA is an integration of two major laws
previously known as the Securities Investment Trust Business Act and the Securities Investment Company
Act.
5
In South Korea, the phrase “private equity fund” has been translated in various ways to refer
alternatively to private securities funds, private securities investment funds, and private company
acquisition funds. The IAMA has also recently introduced a legal investment vehicle known as a
“specialized private equity investment company” (“SPEIC”) which is virtually synonymous with “private
equity fund.” This Article uses the term “private equity fund” to refer to such entities for purposes of
clarity and consistency. Translator’s Note: A more detailed discussion of private equity funds is given
infra Part II.
6
The latest amendment to the IAMA was promulgated on October 5, 2004, through the passage of
Act No. 7221, and became effective December 6, 2004.
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the basic concepts and types of investment funds. Part II examines the
current status of securities investments made by foreign funds in South
Korea. Part III examines several key legal issues in connection with such
investments.
With respect to foreign investments in general, there are other major
issues which this Article does not cover. For example, discussions relating
to domestic sales of beneficiary certificates of foreign funds (especially
mutual funds) and domestic registration of foreign asset management
companies are excluded. Furthermore, while certain foreign funds (e.g.,
Lone Star Korea and Lend Lease Global Properties) continue to play an
important role as major investors in the South Korean real estate and
insolvent credit bond markets, this Article limits its discussion to securities
investments made by foreign funds.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF A FUND AND CLASSIFICATION OF FOREIGN FUNDS

A.

The Fund Concept and Its Classification

The general meaning of the term “fund” is “a pool of capital
established for purposes of achieving particular objectives or conducting
particular activities.” The term is used in this Article to mean an
“investment fund” in line with its traditional economic definition. In other
words, a fund can be defined as a pool of assets generated by multiple
investors with shared interests. It is a shared investment vehicle and, as if it
were a living being, it is recognized as having the ability to bring together
investments on behalf of its investors. 7 In theory, a fund is virtually
synonymous with the so-called “collective investment scheme,” an indirect
collective investment arrangement which pools capital investments from
numerous investors. A specialized professional oversees and manages the
pooled investments and distributes income profits to the investors. In South
Korea, both the fund concept and the IAMA’s definition of an indirect
investment scheme share almost the same meaning.
Funds are generally classified as either agreement-type investment
trusts or entity-type investment companies based on their legal structure.
They can be further categorized as: (1) either open-end investments or
closed-end investments depending on investment pooling methods and
limitations; (2) either unit-type investments or open-type investments based
on the fluctuating or fixed nature of the principal investment; (3) bond-type,
stock-type, or mixed-type funds depending on the tax treatment of investors;
7

Sam Chul Park, Commentary on Investment Vehicles 40 (Sam Woo Sa 2001).
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and (4) either public funds or private funds based on methods used in
attracting investors to the fund.8
Article 27 of the IAMA classifies indirect investment vehicles (i.e.,
funds) based on the type of capital investment. They can fall under any of
the following: (1) securities indirect investment funds; (2) derivative
indirect investment funds; (3) real estate indirect investment funds;
(4) actual indirect investment funds; (5) short-term financial indirect
investment funds; (6) re-indirect investment funds; or (7) special assets
indirect investment funds. Because of the special nature of direct investment
vehicles, Chapter 5 of the IAMA also provides for: (1) exchange traded
indirect investment funds; (2) class-type indirect investment funds;
(3) transfer-type indirect investment funds; (4) mother-child-type indirect
investment funds; (5) securities investment companies for purposes of
corporate restructuring; and (6) securities investment companies for
purposes of company acquisition/takeover.
B.

General Classification of Foreign Funds

Rather than relying on legal classifications, foreign funds investing in
Korean companies can generally be divided into three main categories:
private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds.9 In this Section, this
Article briefly examines the concept behind each of the three fund
categories.10
8
Private equity funds are distinguishable from public offerings, which must comply with various
strict regulations set forth in the Korean Securities and Exchange Act. Public offerings raise funds from
numerous unspecified investors in the form of sale of securities of listed companies to the general public.
By contrast, private equity funds acquire funds from qualified institutional investors or a small number of
unspecified accredited investors. Such investors are generally sophisticated, financially savvy individuals
or entities that have a special association with, or intimate knowledge of, the securities offered by private
equity funds. Whereas the need to protect investors is obvious in public offerings of securities, it is much
less evident in the case of private equity funds. In fact, government regulation in the private equity fund
industry is very low or virtually nonexistent.
9
One representative type of fund frequently discussed is a public pension fund in which
government entities operate as investors. Examples include the Hermes Group pension funds of the United
Kingdom and the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). Another representative
type is the so-called corporate governance improvement fund. The main purpose of such funds is to
improve or reform the corporate governance standards of the companies in which they invest in order to
increase the overall valuation of these companies. Notable examples of corporate governance improvement
funds include the Oppenheimer Funds and CalPERS (as well as Sovereign, which claims to be an
institutional fund aimed at improving corporate governance).
10
The discussion in Part II has been prepared in reliance of the foregoing materials. See generally
Hyung Tae Kim, Promoting and Improving the Infrastructure Private Equity Funds: The Importance of
Buyout Funds (Korean Securities Research Center 2004) (unpublished seminar materials); Hee Jin Noh,
Regulation and Characteristics of Hedge Funds (Korean Securities Research Center 1998); The Korean
Association of Investment Vehicles, Hedge Funds (2002); Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds are
Headed Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555 (2003); Michael
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Private Equity Funds

“Private equity fund” is not a legal term. It generally refers to a pool
of private investments raised by investment experts from a relatively small
number of investors (e.g., institutional investors or investment-savvy
individuals). 11 Such investments are considered mid- or long-term
investments in the form of equity securities that are not generally tradable in
the public marketplace. A private equity fund typically takes the form of a
limited partnership in which a fund manager makes a substantial investment
and becomes a general partner with unlimited liability. On the other hand,
investors in the fund become limited partners with limited liability.12 In the
United States, private equity funds are not subject to regulation under the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Furthermore, virtually no U.S. law exists
to protect investors participating in such funds. Many foreign funds that
have recently become well known in South Korea for their active
investments on Korean soil—such as the Carlyle Group, Lend Lease, and
Newbridge Capital —are private equity funds.
Private equity funds are similar to hedge funds (as discussed below) in
that no legal regulations exist with respect to investor protection. Significant
differences exist, however, between the two in terms of their investment
objectives, methods and strategies, investment period, and types of investors.
For example, private equity funds invest mainly in securities or other related
equities of privately-held corporations (or in the case of public companies,
liquid securities with voting management rights), while hedge funds invest
in various financial market instruments including bonds, financial
derivatives, or currencies in addition to corporate securities. Furthermore,
private equity funds in most cases participate in the management affairs of
their invested companies, whereas hedge funds do not. In addition, private
equity funds aim to reap mid- or long-term investment profits, while hedge
funds focus on short-term profits.
Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152
UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 755 (2003); Joseph W. Barlett & Eric Swan, Private Equity Funds: What Counts and
What Doesn’t, 26 J. CORP. L. 393 (2001); DANIEL A. STRACHMAN, HEDGE FUNDS (2002); Dion Friedland,
Magnum Funds, The Hedge Fund Ass’n, About Hedge Funds, 2001, http://www.thehfa.org//aboutus.cfm.
11
The Investment Company Act of 1940 of the United States classifies investment funds into two
basic categories: (1) private funds, which gather investors by private and confidential means, place no
restrictions on investor eligibility criteria, and involve fewer than 100 investors; and (2) qualified purchaser
funds, which gather investors by private and confidential means, but place limitations on investors by
classifying them as either private investors, who invest more than U.S. $5 million, or general corporations,
which invest more than U.S. $25 million.
12
While it is legally possible to organize an investment vehicle in the form of a limited liability
companies (“LLC”), most vehicles are structured in the form of a limited partnership (“LP”) due to tax
concerns and investor liability issues.
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Private equity funds in South Korea have frequently been associated
with buyout funds. Buyout funds usually seek to acquire management rights
of companies with undervalued assets to increase overall valuation of such
companies through corporate restructuring. When higher valuation is
achieved, the funds sell their securities to other strategic investors to recoup
their investment and reap profits. Buyout funds, however, are just one
representative type of private equity funds. Other types of private equity
funds exist as well. For example, venture capital funds are funds which
primarily invest in early-stage or startup companies. Mezzanine funds invest
mainly in convertible bonds and bonds with stock warrants. In 2003 alone,
approximately U.S. $1.9 billion was invested in the Asian region through
various forms of private equity funds.
2.

Hedge Funds

Hedge funds are funds in which investment experts raise private
equity assets from a small number of investors. They employ various
speculative and leveraged techniques and use financial derivative
instruments to maximize short-term profits in accordance with certain
overall investment strategies. These funds are usually created in tax-haven
jurisdictions. The Quantum Fund run by George Soros is one example of a
hedge fund. Similar to private equity funds, these funds are exempt from
regulation under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.13
The advantages associated with hedge fund investments include
absolute profits and efficient portfolio composition. The disadvantages, on
the other hand, are low levels of transparency, high risk (i.e., speculation),
high fees, and limited liquidity. Similar to private equity funds, hedge funds
invest in shares of non-listed corporations. As of 2004, there were
approximately 8,350 hedge funds operating worldwide, with a global gross
working capital totaling U.S. $875 billion.
In the United States, both investment banks and traditional banks have
recently substantially increased their investments in hedge funds. The Asian
Wall Street Journal reported in October 2004 that Lehman Brothers was
negotiating the acquisition of GLG Partners, a large U.K. hedge fund, and
that JP Chase & Co. had acquired more than half the shares of Highbridge
Capital Management, a New York hedge fund with U.S. $7 billion in assets.
In addition, according to a recent report by Citicorp, the total amount of
investment assets held by hedge funds amounted to U.S. $500 billion in
13
Recent discussion in the U.S. has centered on the issue of desirability of federal regulation of
hedge funds by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. See generally Greupner, supra note 10.
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2000, with 20% owned by institutional investors such as pension funds. It is
expected that hedge fund assets will rise to several trillion dollars by 2010,
with 80% of assets held by institutional investors.14
3.

Mutual Funds

Mutual funds are associated with the concept of open-end/publicoffering indirect investment companies under the IAMA. 15 They are
distinguishable from private equity funds or hedge funds in that mutual
funds raise funds publicly from investors. Mutual funds usually invest in
securities or bonds with high liquidity, such as shares of publicly-held
corporations. To protect the public investor, mutual funds in the United
States are subject to stringent regulations including federal securities laws
and the Investment Company Act of 1940. For instance, all mutual funds
must register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Complete
disclosure to the public must also be made with respect to their operation,
fees, costs, and benefits. In the United States, where the mutual fund
industry is most developed, there were 8,126 mutual funds in operation in
2003, with a total net asset value of U.S. $741.5 billion.
4.

Comparison by Type of Fund
The three types of funds are compared and summarized in Table I.
Table I
Comparison by Fund Type

ENROLLMENT OF INVESTORS
PROTECTION OF INVESTORS
CONTRIBUTION BY FUND
MANAGER
INVESTMENT TYPE
INVESTMENT TIMEFRAME
REGULATION
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO
THE PUBLIC
FUND MANAGER TYPE
FUND MANAGER COMPENSATION
14

PRIVATE EQUITY
FUND
Private
Relaxed
Permitted

Private
Relaxed
Permitted

Public
Stringent
Not Permitted

Equity Securities
Mid- or Long-Term
Absence of
Regulation
No Disclosure

Various Instruments
Short-Term
Absence of
Regulation
No Disclosure

Various Instruments
Mid- or Long-Term
Regulation

Any Person
Incentives

Expert/Professional
Incentives

Expert/Professional
Management Fees

HEDGE FUND

MUTUAL FUND

Disclosure

ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, [No title given by author], Oct. 1, 2004, at M6.
In comparison to investment trusts and companies operating on South Korea soil, far more
numerous, complex contract-type and company-type fund structures are used in the United Kingdom and
the United States, respectively.
15
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CURRENT STATE OF INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS [IN SOUTH
KOREA]

According to the Korea Stock Exchange, the total value of listed
securities investments made by foreigners is approximately U.S. $147
trillion as of August 6, 2004. This amount represents 43.6% of the total
aggregate market capital of the Korean securities market.16
According to Table II,17 the amount of investment made by investment
companies represents approximately 44.0% of the total amount of foreign
securities investments. It is safe to say that investment companies fall into
the category of funds. Because pension funds qualify as funds, and
securities holdings by securities houses are likely held in the form of funds,
one can then conclude that about 50 to 55% of total foreign investments are
made by means of investing through funds.
Table II
Securities Investments by Non-Koreans in South Korea
INVESTMENTS
MADE BY

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

REPRESENTATION
BY PERCENTAGE

INDIVIDUALS

1,995

3,151

3,869

4,535

4,794

5,024

5,243

34.2%

INSTITUTIONS

4,519

5,329

6,085

7,213

8,066

9,104 10,092

65.8%

3,198

3,763

4,239

4,966

5,503

6,190

6,751

44.0%

476

522

598

686

766

874

991

6.5%

250

285

310

336

369

388

421

2.7%

243

282

322

357

361

387

412

2.7%

144

159

180

207

228

250

268

1.7%

208

318

436

661

839

1,015

1,249

8.1%

—INVESTMENT
FUNDS
—PENSION
FUNDS
—SECURITIES
FIRMS
—BANKS
—INSURANCE
COMPANIES
—OTHERS

Based on data gathered from the Korea Securities Exchange, Table III
shows the number of investments in listed Korean companies (two or
greater) made by each non-Korean entity holding more than five percent of

16

The Korea Securities Exchange, Foreign Ownership Figures and Trends in the Aftermath of
KOSPI Peak, Aug. 10, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp.
17
See The Korea Securities Exchange, Share Ownership (of Five Percent or Greater) by Foreigners,
Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp.
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shares, as of April 24, 2004. 18 The author’s independent review of
substantial shareholding (change) reports reveals that the share ownership
figures have been reported in most cases by either an asset management firm
or investment trust consulting firm that manages funds. It seems therefore
that funds are the actual share owners. In particular, it appears that most of
them are firms managing public mutual funds. Table III, however, only
shows information analyzed based on number of investments made by
foreign funds. Although private equity funds make fewer investments
relative to other types of funds, their share investments in companies are
often large enough to give them management rights. It is therefore difficult
to simply conclude that private equity funds’ investments in South Korea
constitute only a small portion of total foreign fund investments as a whole.
Table III
Number of Investments by Foreign Funds in South Korea
(as of April 24, 2004)
NAME OF FOREIGN FUND
Capital Research Management Companies
Capital Group II
JF Asset Management Limited
Templeton Asset Management
Morgan Stanley DW Inc.
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft
Arnold & S Blake Advisors LLC
Fidelity Fund
Neuberger & B LLC
The Korea Fund
ARIS AIG
Hermes Pension Mgt. Ltd.
SIMIL
Mitsubishi Corp.
The Bow Post Group, LLC
Deutsche Bank London
Sumitomo Corp.
Wellington Management Company LLP
Deutsche Investment Management Americas, Inc.
Genesis Asset Managers
Goldman Sachs International
IFC
Joho Fund Ltd.
OCM Emerging Markets FL
Platinum Asset Management Trusts
TOTAL NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS

NUMBER OF
INVESTMENTS MADE
15
13
12
11
9
8
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
125

18
Data was obtained from both the Korea Securities Exchange and the Korean Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation System (“KOSDAQ”).
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Table IV shows a specific breakdown of share ownership in listed
Korean companies by each of several foreign investors (i.e., an investment
management company or a trust investment consulting firm that manages
funds) holding more than five percent of shares.
Statistical information shows that from 2001 onward, many foreign
funds (such as Capital Group International, Inc., Capital Research and
Management Company,19 JF Asset Management Limited,20 Templeton Asset
Management Limited, 21 and Morgan Stanley DW Inc. 22 ) have steadily
increased their investments in many Korean companies. As of June 24,
2004,23 CGII holds a total average of U.S. $2.427 billion in 13 investments
while CRMC holds U.S. $2.286 billion in 17 investments. Both CGII and
CRMC are the two largest foreign fund investors in South Korea in terms of
investment amount. Ranked third is Momenta (Cayman) Ltd.,24 an indirect
investment company located in the Cayman Islands that holds 5,117,550
shares of SK Telecom, valued at U.S. $972 million. It is also the largest
single investment made in terms of investment amount.

19
The Capital Group Companies, Inc. is an investment consulting firm with 100% ownership of
Capital Group International, Inc. (CGII) and Capital Research and Management Company (CRMC).
Neither CGII nor CRMC own securities of their invested companies, but rather manage their investments
on behalf of mutual funds that actually invest in such companies.
20
J.P. Morgan Fleming Asset Management (Asia) Inc. is an investment management company
which fully owns JF Asset Management Limited. The latter also manages investment funds administered
by JPMorgan Chase.
21
This firm manages mutual funds administered by Franklin Templeton Investments.
22
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., an affiliate company of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, manages various
mutual funds and trusts.
23
The Korea Securities Exchange, Reporting of Five Percent or Greater Share Ownership by
Foreigners, Jun. 24, 2004, available at http://www.krx.co.kr/webeng/index.jsp.
24
According to the substantial share ownership report filed by Momenta (Cayman) with the Korean
Securities and Exchange Commission, the investment firm holds American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”)
of SK Telecom Co., Ltd. (“SK Telecom”) for purposes of purchasing bonds that have been issued as part
of SK Telecom’s exchangeable bonds issuance program. SK Telecom’s shares are purchased as original
shares, and the exchangeable bonds are issued based on the purchase of original shares. In this regard, they
should be distinguished from ordinary investment funds.
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Table IV
Securities Investments (5% or Greater) by Foreign Funds in Korean
Companies (as of April 24, 2004)
NAME OF FOREIGN
FUND

CAPITAL RESEARCH
AND MANAGEMENT
COMPANIES
(CRMC)

CAPITAL GROUP
INTERNATIONAL,
INC. (CGII)

NAME OF INVESTED
COMPANY
Keum Kang Koryo
Chemicals
Dae-Gu Bank
Dae-lim Commercial,
Inc.
Pusan Bank
Bing G-rae
Samsung Electronic Co.
Shinhan Financial
Investment Co.
KET
Korea Electric
Han-il Cement
Hyundai Commercial
Development
Hyosung
KEC
LG Construction Co.
LG Fire Insurance Co.
Total: 15
Kookmin Bank
Samsung Fire Insurance
Co.
Shinhan Financial Co.
Cheil
Pulmu Wom
Korea Gas Construction
Korea Tire
Hyundai Commercial
Development
Hyundai Motors Co.
Hyundai Fire Insurance
Co.
INI Steel
LG Construction
LG Cable
Total: 13

NUMBER OF
SHARES
OWNED

TOTAL
NUMBER OF

OWNERSHIP
PERCENTAGE

555,500

OUTSTANDING
SHARES
10,520,000

6,636,650
3,327,740

132,125,000
35,800,000

5.02%
9.30%

15,147,500
541,380
6,066,870
26,487,620

146,683,650
9,951,241
74,693,696
294,401,300

10.33%
5.44%
8.12%
9.00%

14,372,430
407,040
611,030
5,449,960

284,849,400
8,073,375
6,883,087
75,384,180

5.05%
5.04%
8.88%
7.23%

2,495,000
583,710
3,676,400
3,218,610
89,577,440
20,154,700
4,685,758

32,818,752
8,054,797
51,000,000
60,000,000

7.60%
7.25%
7.21%
5.36%

336,379,116
48,874,837

5.99%
9.59%

24,370,204
391,670
316,470
3,955,520
9,338,240
8,325,868

294,401,300
4,601,649
5,159,568
77,284,510
150,189,929
75,384,180

8.28%
8.51%
6.13%
5.12%
6.22%
11.04%

12,282,139
681,210

219,518,502
8,940,000

5.60%
7.62%

6,009,170
4,417,670
1,640,040
96,568,659

98,897,919
51,000,000
32,200,000

6.08%
8.66%
5.09%

[Table IV continues on next page]

5.28%
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Table IV (continued)

JF ASSET
MANAGEMENT
LIMITED

TEMPLETON ASSET
MANAGEMENT

Gwang Ju Shin Segae
Dept. Store
Keum Kang Koryo
Chemicals
Dae Shin Securities
Samsung Tech One
Sam Yang Gennex
Sam Hwa Crown
Sung Shin Co.
Shin Do Ri Co.
NC Soft
Korea Export
Packaging Co.
LC Cable
STX
Total: 12
Dong-Ah Chemicals
Samsung Micro
Chemicals
Samsung Mid
Young Won Export
Woong-Jin Co Way
Poong San
Hite Beer
Hyundai Commercial
Dev. Co.
Cheil Jedang (CJ)
LG Health Co.
SK Corp.
Total: 11

80,370

1,600,000

5.02%

638,652

10,520,000

6.07%

3,643,500
5,168,800
190,950
226,070
1,564,990
507,690
1,149,597
260,040

48,586,400
77,000,000
2,985,917
3,736,455
19,142,775
10,080,029
18,908,454
4,000,000

7.50%
6.71%
6.40%
6.05%
8.18%
5.04%
6.08%
6.50%

1,777,990
1,628,779
16,837,428
813,410
4,684,460

32,200,000
21,239,063

5.52%
7.67%

9,514,000
25,800,000

8.55%
18.16%

23,163,673
6,403,150
1,859,430
2,785,630
962,190
14,770,370

230,865,031
51,014,336
23,959,690
32,000,000
19,197,208
75,384,180

10.03%
12.55%
7.76%
8.65%
5.01%
19.59%

1,844,570
1,648,230
6,394,390
62,329,503

23,972,727
15,618,197
126,977,822

7.69%
10.55%
5.04%

Tables V and VI show a list of representative transactions in which
foreign funds made investments in listed Korean financial institutions and
Korean companies, respectively, with an intent to either acquire management
rights or participate in management affairs.25

25
Tables V and VI have been selectively prepared using data compiled by Hyung Tae Kim. See
supra note 10.
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Table V
Acquisitions by Foreign Funds of Korean Financial Institutions
ACQUIRED
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION
Good Morning
Securities
Korea Exchange
Bank
Hamni Bank

FOREIGN FUND

INVESTMENT
DATE

H&Q, Lombard

May 1998

INVESTMENT
AMOUNT
(U.S. MILLIONS)
$82

August 2003

$1,060

Carlyle Group

September 1998

$385

Korea First Bank

Newbridge Capital

December 1998

$427

Kookmin Bank

Goldman Sachs

May 1999

$500

Korea Exchange Card

Olympus Capital

December 1999

$118

Hana Bank

Allianz AG

April 2000

$150

LG Card

Warburg Pincus

October 2000

$370

Lone Star

INVESTMENT
PURPOSE
Acquisition
(48%)
Acquisition
(55%)
Acquisition
(40%)
Acquisition
(50%)
Share Purchase
(11%)
Acquisition
(54%)
Share Purchase
(12%)
Share Purchase
(19%)

Table VI
Acquisitions by Foreign Funds of Korean Companies
ACQUIRED
COMPANY
Winnia Mando
Mando Inc.
Hae Tae
Hanaro
Communications

FOREIGN FUND
UBS Capital
Consortium
JP Morgan
Partners Consortium
UBS Capital
Consortium
Newbridge-AIG

November 1999

INVESTMENT
AMOUNT
(U.S. MILLIONS)
$201

Asset Purchase

January 2000

$470

Asset Purchase

July 2001

$410

Asset Purchase

October 2003

$1,100

Stock Transfer

INVESTMENT
DATE

INVESTMENT
PURPOSE

In the above transactions, all of the investments which led to
acquisition of management rights were made by private equity funds.
Unlike public mutual funds, private equity funds have invested enough to
acquire management rights or at least participate in management. As
illustrated above, foreign private equity funds have invested in Korean
financial institutions for the specific purpose of acquiring management
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rights. 26 It is this fact which may have sparked such intense discussion
about encouraging the creation of domestic private equity funds in South
Korea.
In many cases, foreign funds have become increasingly proactive
shareholders. Not only have they exercised their shareholder rights at the
annual shareholders meeting, but they have also demanded that the
controlling shareholders and management improve corporate governance,
enhance management transparency, and give priority to shareholders’
interests.
For example, the Capital Group demanded that Samsung Electronics
appoint outside directors in 2000 and 2001 and move its principal place of
business to New York in 2003. Moreover, in 2004 the fund requested that
Samsung’s CEO and CFO participate in one of their board of directors
meetings.27 Although such exhibits of shareholder activism by foreign funds
may be perceived as management interference, one cannot deny the fact that
foreign funds have contributed significantly to the overall improvement of
corporate governance and management transparency of major Korean
companies. Accordingly, one would expect that foreign funds will make use
of their shareholders rights in an active and decisive manner, either in their
individual capacity or in cooperation with other foreign investors.
Until now, foreign funds that have sought to acquire management
rights of Korean companies have done so through friendly purchases of
shares from other majority shareholders, by means of open competition or
negotiation. However, recently there has been much discussion about the
possibility of hostile takeovers in South Korea by foreign investors. In
reality, hostile takeovers in the form of foreign fund investments remain a
rare phenomenon to this day. One notable exception has been Sovereign’s
acquisition of SK Corp. shares in early 2004. Hostile takeovers initiated by
foreigners are unlikely to become more common because they are not
encouraged by the current Korean business climate. Furthermore, labor
unions and company employees tend to show considerable opposition to the
prospect of job loss resulting from corporate restructuring. However, as
illustrated by Kumkang Korea Chemical’s recent hostile takeover attempt of
Hyundai Elevator Inc., if domestic firms are likely to increasingly engage in
26
Although the Carlyle Group did not achieve the status of first-priority negotiators, they not only
actively participated in the bidding process for the contemplated sale of Daehan Investment & Securities,
Ltd. and the Korea Investment Securities Co., Ltd., but they were also heavily involved in the actual sale of
Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery Ltd.
27
Foreign Assault – Preparing for the Worst Case Scenario: Emergency M&A Agenda for Samsung
Electronics, KOREA ECONOMY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2004, at P1.
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hostile takeover attempts in the near future, one cannot disregard the
possibility of such attempts by foreign funds, especially private equity funds.
IV.

PROBLEMS ARISING FROM INVESTMENTS BY FOREIGN FUNDS

The following is a list of general problems with respect to investments
by foreign funds in domestic Korean companies:28
1. The possibility of acquiring management rights;
2. Issues relating to large dividend payouts to securities held by
foreigners;
3. The reduction in floating stocks;
4. The possibility of withdrawal of foreign capital from the
Korean securities market; and
5. The risk of harm to the Korean financial system resulting
from use of financial derivatives.
It is safe to say that these matters can typically arise in the case of
investments by foreign funds. Nevertheless, they become much more severe
when investments are made by so-called financial investors, relative to
investments made by industrial investors.
Because this Article focuses on exploring legal issues, it stops short of
examining the above matters in detail. The purpose of this Part is to merely
illustrate a set of more general problems associated with investments by
foreign funds in South Korea.
V.

RELATED LEGAL ISSUES

This Part reviews several key legal issues concerned with domestic
investments by foreign funds. In the aftermath of the heated dispute over
management control rights of SK Corp. between Sovereign and controlling
shareholders, many discussions 29 have focused on the belief that South
Korea lacks appropriate legal defensive measures against potential hostile

28
For a further discussion of problematic issues, see Je-Chul Kim et al., Discussion of Problematic
Issues in Connection with Comparative Share Ownership by Foreigners, Korean Securities Research
Center (Jun. 2004). See also Hyun Soo Park, Acquisition Strategies and Takeover Defenses of [Korean]
Companies by Foreign Investors, 50 SANG-JANG HYUP 83 (2004).
29
In this regard, overseas anti-takeover measures, such as the so-called “poison pill” and the voting
rights system (golden shares versus ordinary shares) have been discussed as alternative defensive strategies.
Most measures, however, have not been tested as valid under existing Korean law. Introducing them as
part of legislation in South Korea would require overcoming numerous obstacles.
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takeovers or undue management interference by foreign companies,
including foreign funds.
However, foreign funds’ efforts to participate in management are, by
and large, carried out within legally permissible procedures and methods in
accordance with relevant domestic laws, such as the Securities Exchange Act
or the Commercial Code. In many cases, they make legitimate claims for
corporate action (e.g., initiating corporate governance reform measures) by
actively exercising their shareholder rights.
Moreover, the issue of whether a hostile M&A should be accepted or
tolerated is a matter of national government policy. In many circumstances,
it becomes irrelevant to consider the nationality of entities or persons
initiating hostile takeovers.
Accordingly, instead of discussing legal issues in a general sense, this
Article attempts to examine several significant issues 30 that have been
uncovered by one attorney in the course of his own legal practice. The
Article also suggests the author’s opinions on ways to resolve such matters.
Much of the following discussion is applicable not only to foreign funds but
also to investments made by foreign individuals.
A.

The Problem of Reverse Discrimination Faced by Domestic Investors

As revealed in the management rights dispute between Sovereign and
incumbent management, as well as in the context of promoting domestic
private equity funds [in South Korea], one problematic issue has been that
domestic investors face systematic reverse discrimination when compared to
foreign investors and their funds.
1.

The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

Under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”),
domestic companies (especially large conglomerates) are subject to an array
of stringent regulations. For example, when conglomerates establish holding
companies or conduct activities related to holding companies, they must
abide by certain limitations set forth in the MRFTA. In addition, the
MRFTA places restrictions on the conglomerates’ gross investment amount
30
There are important tax issues to consider, such as corporate taxation on dividend income for
funds and marginal profits in share transfers, and taxation on securities exchanges. This Article does not
deal with such issues, however. Further, Citigroup Inc. acquired management rights of KorAm Bank from
the Carlyle group in February 2004, and it attempted to delist the Korean bank from the Korea Securities
Exchange. Since large amounts of dividends and capital decreases are involved, it is difficult to regard
them as merely fund-related matters. This Article does not take into account such matters since relevant
activities are pursued through regulation and other legal procedures.
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and guarantee of debts for their related subsidiaries. Foreign investors, in
contrast, are not subject to such restrictions or limitations. In the case of
foreign funds, it is plausible that the funds may be classified as holding
companies since their main purpose is investment in other companies. The
MRTFA, however, does not currently regulate holding companies
incorporated overseas.
Under the MFRTA’s extraterritoriality theory, the Korean statute may
reach and govern business combinations that produce a large effect on the
domestic market even though they occur on foreign soil. Nevertheless, rules
that purport to place limitations on holding companies and restrictions on
gross investment amount are in theory difficult to apply to companies
incorporated in foreign jurisdictions. The Korea Fair Trade Commission
presumably has no plans to apply such provisions to foreign funds.
2.

Regulation by Finance-Related Laws

Under the Financial Holding Company Act (“FHCA”), non-financial
institutions cannot in principle acquire voting shares amounting to more than
four percent of the total outstanding shares of a bank holding company
(Section 1 of Article 8-2). Under the Banking Act, the same entities cannot
acquire voting shares amounting to more than ten percent of the total
outstanding shares of a bank without the approval of the Korean Financial
Supervisory Commission (“KSFC”). Furthermore, non-financial institutions
cannot in principle acquire voting shares amounting to more than four
percent of the total outstanding shares of a bank (Article 16-2).
Such restrictions do not apply to foreign funds, however, because they
can qualify as financial institutions by merely modifying their investment
portfolios.
3.

Stringent Regulation of Private Indirect Investment Vehicles Under the
IAMA

Private indirect investment vehicles and securities investment
company vehicles established to facilitate business takeovers (i.e., private
equity M&A funds)31 were heavily regulated under the IAMA prior to the
December 2004 amendment. A substantial number of restrictions (e.g.,
restrictions on fund operations or exemption from public notice
31
Where an investment company’s indirect investment scheme involves incorporation for the
purpose of associating another company as its affiliate company, the voting rights restriction under the
IAMA does not apply. See IAMA art. 142.
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requirements) 32 applicable to general indirect investment vehicles do not
apply to private direct invest vehicles that satisfy the following criteria:33 (1)
funds with fewer than 30 investors; (2) indirect investors that are either
funds or institutional investors; (3) private individuals that are investing at
least U.S. $10 million; or (4) non-individual legal entities corporations that
are investing at least U.S. $50 million. Accordingly, unless specifically
exempted under Korean law, all such vehicles must adhere to regulations in
the IAMA. In particular, Section 2 of Article 89 of the IAMA prohibits
investors from: (1) borrowing money to fund their investments; (2)
guaranteeing debt repayment; or (3) furnishing security.
Under the December 2004 amendment, the IAMA introduced a new
framework for the creation of a specialized private equity investment
company (“SPEIC”), in an effort to promote domestic private equity funds
that can eventually compete effectively with foreign private equity funds.
Similar to U.S. private equity funds, a SPEIC is organized in the form of a
limited partnership under the Korean Commercial Code (“KCC”), consisting
of a general partner (the management firm which has unlimited liability) and
limited partners (the investors who have limited liability). Under certain
scenarios, regulatory measures are eased with respect to: (1) restrictions on
acquisition of shares in banking and financial holding companies; (2)
limitations on gross investment amount; and (3) restrictions regarding
holding companies. On its face, reverse discrimination against domestic
companies in this matter has been remedied for the most part. When
compared to foreign funds, however, SPEICs are disappointing to some
extent. First, the legal structure of SPEICs is restricted to the form of a
limited partnership under the KCC. Second, investments made must be
greater than ten percent of a targeted company’s total shares. Third, no clear
criteria have been provided in connection with permissible investments by
pension funds, as had initially been proposed by the government
amendment.

32

See IAMA art. 175.
Investment trusts and investment companies are generally prohibited from investing in investment
securities in excess of 10/100 of the total value of assets of each indirect investment fund, or investing in
excess of 10/100 of the total number of shares issued by the same company per the total value of assets of
each indirect investment fund. See IAMA art. 88, §§ 1-2. This general provision, however, is inapplicable
to private equity indirect investment schemes. See IAMA art. 88, § 1; IAMA art. 175, § 1.
33
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Restricting the Voting Rights of a Majority Shareholder in Appointing
a Member of Audit Committee Who Is Neither an Auditor Nor an
Outside Director
This matter is dealt with separately in detail below.

5.

Issues Pertaining to Statement of Substantial Share Ownership (and
Statement of Changes in Substantial Share Ownership)

The issue of fairness has become a subject of debate surrounding the
alleged discriminatory sanctions imposed for violations committed in
connection with the statement of substantial share ownership requirements
(i.e., the five-percent rule) on the part of foreign funds and financial
companies. When the violations occurred, domestic companies were
criminally indicted by prosecutors, whereas their foreign counterparts were
simply given notice or warnings. According to official government reports
submitted by the KSFC as of September 2004, violations committed by
foreign funds and foreign financial companies numbered 77 in 2002, 122 in
2003, and 61 in 2004. The remedial measures taken by the KSFC were
practically ineffective, amounting to a mere slap on the wrist. For domestic
companies and individual investors, on the other hand, there have been a
total of 1,175 violations from 2002 through the first half of 2004. About
13.7% (161 cases) of the violations resulted in criminal indictments by
prosecutors. Additionally, at least seven court orders for liquidation of
shares have been issued since 1997.34 Some believe this constitutes reverse
discrimination against domestic companies and investors.
In many cases, however, violations committed abroad by foreign
funds and foreign financial companies resulted from their difficulties with
producing and submitting the required documents in a short time frame. In
other words, their violations were merely technical in nature. By contrast,
most of the violations by their South Korean counterparts which led to an
indictment or a share-liquidation order were cases involving intentional
violations of relevant laws, including stock price manipulations. Therefore,
it is doubtful whether a simple comparison of the number of violations can
provide any meaningful information. Other matters regarding the statement
of substantial share ownership requirements will be considered in the
following section.

34

Foreigners’ 5% Rule Violations, KOREAN ECONOMICS NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004, at P1.
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B.

Issues Pertaining to the Statement of Substantial Share Ownership
(and the Statement of Changes in Substantial Share Ownership)

1.

The General Problem

The Korean Securities and Exchange Act (“KSEA”) contains an
important provision which requires the filing of a statement of substantial
share ownership (Article 200-2). 35 When the number of shares held by
majority shareholders changes, the KSEA requires this information to be
disclosed to the public. This provision is intended to heighten the
transparency and fairness of the securities market and to expedite public
announcement of hostile acquisitions of shares held by existing majority
shareholders or management. The public disclosure system is essential to
advance investor protection. It is important to disclose the identity of
persons intending to acquire shares and the purpose of their acquisitions
because the company stock price can be seriously affected by share
acquisitions that lead to disputes over management rights.36 In addition, the
public disclosure system is vital because of the possibility of unfair share
purchase transactions.
Foreign funds’ legal structure and investment schemes, however,
differ from those of domestic funds. In particular, foreign private equity
funds are not typically required to furnish investment information to the
public. Moreover, even in substantial share acquisitions which cannot be
regarded as portfolio investments, the contents of substantial share
ownership statements are by themselves less than useful. On the sole basis
of such statements, one would have difficulties finding relevant information
about the majority shareholders or the management. Ordinary investors
would also have a very hard time obtaining the identities of the actual
beneficial owners of the funds, let alone information concerning their
business organization and true investment purpose.37

35

Jae-Hyun Im, [Korean] Securities Regulation and Laws 635 (Park Young Sa ed., 2000).
Empirical research has shown that that when an investor’s purpose behind holding a large number
of securities is publicly disclosed as simply “for investment,” the rate of return on his investment is far
higher than when the announcement is made as “plans for acquisition of additional shares.” See RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 935 (2d ed. 1995).
37
In reality, a question arises as to whether Sovereign properly or adequately stated its purpose for
share acquisition in SK Corp., given that it had listed “creating profits” in its filed statement of substantial
share ownership. Based on Sovereign’s action thus far, there is a high possibility that the SK Corp.
investment is not merely a portfolio investment, but an investment geared toward participation in SK
Corp.’s management. Some have alleged that Sovereign had this intention at the time of the statement
filing. Accordingly, a related issue arises as to whether this action constitutes a materially false statement.
36
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Accordingly, prior to the recent amendment to the IAMA, an
electronic notification system had been utilized for the substantial share
ownership statements. Investors were required to provide only a very brief
statement of investment purpose with respect to their share ownership or
changes in existing share ownership. For example, investors had been
permitted under the law to state only a few words, such as “management
participation,” “investment to acquire management rights,” or “investment to
manage securities products.” No rules or provisions existed for submission
of other information such as investment type, classification, or contents. In
effect, the older version of the IAMA contained no guidance with regard to
the detailed disclosure of investment purpose.
On the other hand, when several funds are combined for the purpose
of acquiring a substantial amount of shares in a company, it is likely that the
funds are not meaningfully related to one another. Even if a relationship
does exist, in many cases the funds are probably not familiar with each other
and are likely unknown to the public. Accordingly, if several funds are
combined to purchase substantial shares in violation of the public disclosure
requirement, stock price movements will likely be unpredictable from the
perspective of both the company invested in and the market. Especially in
cases where large-scale asset management companies operate multiple
funds, problems may potentially arise when fund managers are placed under
undue pressure from outside influences because (1) communication and
decisions are made entirely by fund managers and (2) no investment
companies maintain perfectly functioning internal control systems with
respect to the public disclosure of funds. This sort of problem could become
more serious when the asset management companies involved are
incorporated overseas and operate dozens or hundreds of funds.
2.

Technical Problems Peculiar to Foreign Funds

Where an asset management company (i.e., a fund manager) operates
multiple funds, other concerned parties face the problem of determining who
actually constitutes “specially related persons” and whether certain holdings
of shares amount to “quasi-ownership” under the Presidential Decree of the
KSEA. They also face the problem of determining whether or not filings of
substantial share ownership statements have been actually made by the fund
manager or company. This is true even when the parties have fully complied
with the requirements set forth in the statement of substantial share
ownership reports. For this reason, the KSFC implemented a new disclosure
system in March 2004. The new disclosure system first considers whether
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or not the asset management company in question actually holds shares. It
then determines whether or not the investment company and funds are
“specially related,” and if so, it further classifies them as either “wholly
related” or “partially related.”38 The new disclosure system is enormously
complex, containing many ambiguous elements. Substantial confusion is
therefore likely to result for the time being.
The IAMA requires that substantial share ownership statements be
filed within five business days of the date of share acquisition. It is
practically impossible, however, for large-scale overseas asset management
companies to meet this requirement because most of them invest through
dozens of funds and must combine their investment activities. In many
cases, therefore, unintentional violations of the disclosure rule occur. This
can ultimately lead to internal compliance issues because such violations are
deemed to constitute violations of securities laws in their home
jurisdictions. 39 Hence where the purpose of investment is neither to
participate in management nor to acquire management rights, it seems
necessary to adopt measures providing exceptions to existing policy,
permitting foreign investors to (1) submit a combined filing on or prior to
the tenth day of the following month (as had been applicable to domestic
institutional investors) or (2) submit an initial filing which is supplemented
afterwards with additional materials.
3.

The Need for Adequate Disclosure

For the reasons outlined above, it is necessary to implement additional
requirements on investment funds in order to provide more information to
the public. Regardless of whether the funds are foreign or domestic, there is
a high likelihood that the true identities of actual investors—masked under
the fund names—will not be disclosed to the public in an adequate manner.
There is no harm involved in demanding information from the actual
investors so that their identities may be publicly released. It is also not
unreasonable to demand information from them about the funds they
actually own as long as there is no undue burden on their part. In the United
States, for instance, funds must disclose in detail the nature of any
38
Korean Financial Supervisory Commission, System Proposals to Improve Public Disclosure of
Share Ownership and Clarification of Reporting Methods Associated with Statement of Ownership of
Shares of Foreign Mutual Funds (Mar.16, 2004).
39
Foreign investors generally submit substantial share ownership statements with the assistance of a
domestic law firm. When foreign investors fail to meet the submission deadline as a result of being
unaware of the legal requirements or lack of adequate preparation, the Korean Financial Supervisory
Commission issues a warning letter. In some cases, several domestic law firms representing foreign
investors have received multiple warning letters on behalf of their clients.
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shareholding relationship and information about their employees. Further,
Schedule 13-D, a form used in the filing of a statement of substantial share
ownership to comply with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
requires a furnisher to provide specific details such as information on each
partner in a general partnership or a limited partnership. There are
additional requirements under Schedule 13-D. It requires disclosure of
information relating to the identities of persons or entities having control or
authority of a partner. In cases where the partner is a corporation, additional
disclosure must be made with respect to any officer and any other entity
which has control of the corporation.40
To make public disclosure effective, information relating to
“personnel and employees” of a fund should be furnished in detail as well as
information relating to specific circumstances that give reasonable
inferences of the funds’ investment purposes. Accordingly, the KSFC has
recently introduced additional requirements in connection with filing of the
substantial share ownership statement. When filing, a furnisher is required
to choose between two initial categories: either “ordinary investment,” or
“investment to acquire management rights or to participate in management.”
In the latter category, the furnisher is required to provide the following
disclosures with specificity: (1) current intent to either directly or indirectly
engage in management; (2) plans to replace or change management; (3)
future plans relating to direct participation in management (including plans
to elect the furnisher or other specially-related parties41 as officers); (4) plans
to amend provisions in the articles of incorporation relating to changes in the
management structure, including the number of directors; (5) plans relating
to any additional share acquisitions; and (6) plans to sell or liquidate
shares. 42 These new disclosure requirements set by the KSFC seem to
mirror those requirements found in the U.S. disclosure system. The revised
disclosure system is regarded as being especially helpful in gathering
adequate information on foreign funds’ investment objectives.43
40

For a detailed discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, Recent Trends and Legal Policies in the [Korean]
M&A Market, BFL, Vol. 6, 43-44.
41
The phrase “specially-related party” or “specially-related person” can be generally defined as
either a party that directly or indirectly owns 50% or more of the voting shares of the other party or a party
that can de facto determine or control the other party's business policy.
42
Summary Briefing Report, Methods and Contents of Share Ownership Purpose and
Announcement of 5% Public Disclosure Requirement, The Korean Financial Supervisory Commission,
Oct. 5, 2004.
43
Other than the enumerated matters that are subject to disclosure, the United States’ Schedule 13-D
Item 4 also requires the submission of information in connection with any plan for (1) an extraordinary
corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the issuer or any of its
subsidiaries; (2) a sale or transfer of substantially all assets of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries; and (3)
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Restricting the Voting Rights of a Majority Shareholder in Appointing
a Member of an Audit Committee Who Is Neither an Auditor Nor an
Outside Director

When electing auditors, Section 2 of Article 409 of the KCC places a
statutory limit on the amount of voting shares by providing that “any
shareholder who holds more than three percent of the total outstanding
shares, exclusive of non-voting shares, may not exercise his vote with
respect to the shares in excess of the above limit.” Under the KSEA,
however, majority shareholders’ voting rights are limited to three percent in
combination of specially-related persons’ voting rights. (Section 11(1) of
Article 191 of the KSEA and Section 18 of Article 84 of the Presidential
Decree of the KSEA).
At the 2004 general shareholder meeting of SK Corp., Sovereign split
its main fund into several parts (establishing five separate subsidiaries
holding 100% of total shares). Each subsidiary was made to hold less than
three percent of the total number of outstanding shares, which effectively
meant that Sovereign fully exercised all of its voting share rights. On the
other hand, other controlling shareholders were deemed single individual
shareholders and exercised no greater than three percent voting share rights.
Although Sovereign indicated their reason for the split as “internal risk
management” on their change of ownership statement, it is more likely that
Sovereign’s actions were deliberately taken in view of the above statutory
limitations on voting share rights.
The KSEA provision is primarily intended to protect minority
shareholders by making it difficult for a majority shareholder of listed
companies to appoint non-outside directors who are auditors. In reality,
however, the provision helps to serve the interests of majority shareholders
who can potentially acquire management rights. In particular, it can give
greater protection to foreign funds with enormous financial assets. As
illustrated by the Sovereign case, foreign investors in South Korea can freely
establish multiple funds by dividing their owned shares into many parts. By
contrast, domestic shareholders’ voting shares (including the shares of any
specially related persons) face the three-percent restrictions under the KSEA
provision. Moreover, the possibility of transferring or dispersing domestic

any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of an issuer where the issuer is a
closed-end mutual fund.
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shareholders’ shares to third parties is practically slim because of restrictions
placed on gross investment amount and tax burdens on stock transfer profits.
This illustrates one instance of reverse discrimination against Korean
investors.
Restricting the voting rights of shareholders in appointing a member
of the audit committee is intended primarily to protect minority
shareholders. Hence within the context of the problem above, no significant
differences should exist between a shareholder with the largest number of
shares and a majority shareholder. Accordingly, a majority shareholder who
holds more than ten percent of the total outstanding shares must meet a
separate public disclosure obligation under the KSEA. Because of this
additional requirement, it is more reasonable to apply the KSEA provision to
majority shareholders as well—to restrict their voting rights in appointing a
member of the audit committee who is not an outside director (taking into
account the shares of any specially-related persons). This would likely
prevent a majority shareholder (having ten percent or more of shares) from
exerting undue influence over the audit member-appointing process.
Further, this would help strengthen the voting rights of true minority
shareholders and can help eliminate the reverse discrimination resulting
from some of the MRFTA restrictions levied against domestic companies or
shareholders.
D.

Application of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act

The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (“FIPA”) is intended mainly to
promote foreign direct investment. Various benefits are conferred upon
those foreign investors whose investments constitute “foreign investment”
within the meaning of the FIPA. Under the MRFTA, where a company
acquires or owns securities of a foreign-invested company under the FIPA,
two things happen. First, the company secures a five-year grace period in
which no restrictions are placed on the company with respect to gross
investments made from the date of such acquisition or ownership (Section
1(3) of Article 10 of the MRFTA). Furthermore, regulations dealing with
securities acquisition and disposition under the Foreign Exchange
Transactions Act (“FETA”) become applicable. However, if a foreign
investor in principal invests greater than U.S. $50,000 and acquires more
than ten percent of the total outstanding shares in any invested company, the
company is deemed to be a foreign investment company within the meaning
of the FIPA.
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The FIPA does not target short-term portfolio investments, but instead
facilitates long-term investments to promote the development of invested
companies in cooperation with majority shareholders and management.
Although investments made by foreign private equity funds may qualify as
“long-term investments” under the FIPA, they are in many cases mere
portfolio investments. Despite this, it is difficult to fathom how a foreign
private equity fund can be considered a foreign direct investment and
therefore obtain various benefits under the FIPA on the basis of only
acquiring at least ten percent of the total outstanding shares of a Korean
company (including acquisitions made in aggregate with other funds).
Hence, when Sovereign acquired 14.99% of SK Corp. shares, SK
Corp. became by default a foreign investment company within the meaning
of the FIPA. Under the MRFTA, the parent SK Group therefore violated the
restrictions on gross investment amount and became subject to voting rights
restrictions based on the number of shares held. The violation exceeded the
scope of the MRTFA by virtue of the exemption under FIPA, leading to a
completely unexpected result. The South Korean government has therefore
proposed to amend the relevant provision of the MRFTA (Chapter 10,
Article 1, Section 3). 44 The proposed amendment would exempt foreign
investments from the restrictions on gross investment amount and be
applicable only if a foreign investor (or its subsidiaries) holds more than ten
percent of the total outstanding shares of the invested companies. This
amendment alone, however, would not completely resolve the problem
outlined above.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has given a brief and general introduction to foreign
funds and reviewed several legal issues related to the current state of their
equity investments in South Korea. The Korean securities market is now a
part of the global capital market. Securities investments held by foreign
investors amount to approximately 40 percent of the total aggregate value of
listed securities in the Korean market and more than 50 percent of these
foreign-owned securities are held by foreign funds. Foreign securities
investments in South Korea will probably not decline in the near future. In
this setting, one should not focus solely on negative aspects of foreign fund
investments or conclude that management of Korean companies by
foreigners is entirely bad. In reality, foreign investment activities in South
44
Translator’s Note: This amendment was passed by the Korean National Assembly in December
31, 2004, and became effective April 1, 2005.
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Korea have had great positive impact on the economy. In particular, they
have made substantial contributions to improving corporate governance of
Korean companies. Therefore, this Article suggests that further efforts
should be made by the South Korean government to devise and improve
ways of attracting foreign investment, including foreign funds, to the Korean
capital markets. The current system demands further reform, since foreign
investments still face unreasonable procedural hurdles like the short time
limitation imposed on filing of the statement of substantial share ownership
statement. In addition, South Korea should encourage and promote longterm direct investments by foreigners, rather than focusing only on portfolio
investments. South Korea should also conduct analyses of investment trends
and techniques, taking into account different types of investors.
Moreover, South Korea should implement additional legal measures
to further alleviate the impact of reverse discrimination against its domestic
companies and investors. In this context, the recent amendment to the
IAMA bodes well. It is poised to create a vital framework through which
domestic funds can compete effectively with their foreign counterparts.
Similar to foreign funds, domestic private equity funds will assume a
significant role in South Korea’s corporate governance system and the M&A
market.
Because this Article examined several legal issues from the author’s
standpoint, it was unable to consider many other important aspects of this
debate. The author hopes further discussions will continue on such matters
in the future.

